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CENTRAL BANK EXCHANGE RATE POLICY*
Introduction
Interest in central bank, exchange rate policy has been stimulated
by two questions which have arisen in the context of experience with
managed or floating exchange rates since the end of the international
fixed parity system in the spring of 1973. The first and broader
question is what determines exchange rates when they are managed or
floating, including the role of central banks and monetary policy in
such determination. The second, narrower question is . to what extent
discretionary exchange rate policy gives national monetary authorities
a policy instrument additional to the instruments employed in imple-
menting control over domestic interest rates or money stocks. This
second issue involves the distinction between sterilized and non-
sterilized exchange market intervention and the effectiveness of each
in influencing exchange rates. Central banks and finance ministries
recently have completed a cooperative investigation of this second
issue and have published their findings in a "Report of the Working
Group on Exchange Market Intervention" (March 1983).
Each of these two themes in the literature involves the behavior
of central banks in implementing national exchange rate policy. The
present study takes central bank exchange rate policy as its focus.
In section one we consider the scope for central bank discretion
*We wish to express our appreciation for the very helpful criti-
cisms of an earlier version of this study by Dr. Wolfgang Gebauer and
Dr. Roland Vaubel and for the research assistance of Robert W. DeLarm,
Hugo Fasano-Filho, Urs Kienberger and Carla Tighe. Remaining short-
comings are our responsibility.
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assigned to it within the broader national framework concerning
exchange rate policy. Section two surveys a variety of central bank
measures to influence exchange rates, comments on their respective
roles, and gives our reasons for selecting direct, active intervention
in the foreign exchange market as the focus for our empirical work in
this paper. Section three presents a general perspective on the role
of intervention as a central bank policy instrument. In section four
we develop a general model for central bank intervention behavior.
Section five discusses problems encountered in the measurement of
direct intervention due to the reticence of central banks in making
intervention data public. The lack of published data necessitates an
indirect approach involving numerous adjustments so as to estimate
intervention from other published statistics. In section six we pre-
sent and discuss econometric estimates of policy reaction functions
for intervention behavior for the central banks of the Federal
Republic of Germany and France. Section seven contains our conclu-
sions and final comments.
1 . Scope for Central Bank Discretion
Central banks are the national institutions normally assigned
responsibility for implementing national policy with respect to the
foreign exchange value of the national currency. Typically, however,
central banks exercise discretion over foreign exchange rate policy
only within limits established by official government policy. Central
banks do not negotiate a nation's participation in international mone-
tary agreements such as membership in the International Monetary Fund
or participation in the European Monetary System. Yet each of these
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cooperative international organizations places restrictions in prin-
ciple on national exchange rate policy. Under the IMF Articles of
Agreement nations and thus their banks agree "To promote exchange sta-
bility, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members, and
to avoid competitive exchange depreciation." They agree also to
refrain from imposing restrictions on the making of payments and
transfers for current international transactions without the per-
2
mission of the Fund. Thus, under normal conditions, exchange
controls are not to be applied to current account transactions.
More stringent limits on central bank discretion over exchange
rate policy are imposed by national participation in the European
Monetary System (EMS). The parity grid of bilateral exchange rates
organized by the participants in the EMS makes intervention mandatory
and automatic when defined limits to departures from parity are
reached. A second indicator calling for intervention or other correc-
tive action is defined in terms of the divergence between the current
ECU market value of a national currency and its ECU parity within the
system. when the divergence thus measured reaches a specified limit
the national authorities have a presumptive obligation to intervene or
take other appropriate measures to counter the divergence. In prac-
tice persistent divergence often has resulted in negotiated realign-
ment of parities within the EMS. Central banks may provide technical
advice in such negotiations, but decisions are reached by finance
ministers or other representatives of national government. Such deci-
sions may be strongly affected by political as well as economic con-
siderations .
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For countries operating a managed exchange rate regime outside the
EMS the decision to aim at a target exchange rate defined relative to a
key reference currency or some weighted average of currencies typi-
cally is not made at the sole discretion of the central bank but is
made by or in consultation with the upper reaches of government.
Under the Reagan administration in the United States, for example, the
Federal Reserve System has been required for substantial periods to
refrain completely from active intervention in the foreign exchange
ma rke t
.
Thus, the behavior of central banks in implementing exchange rate
policy must fit within the range of choice assigned to them by the
broader framework of exchange rate policy determined by national
governments. This fact has implications for the kinds of questions
about exchange rate policy that are in principle answerable by an
investigation of central bank activity intended to influence exchange
rates. In particular observable central bank actions to influence an
exchange rate are unlikely to afford much insight into the timing of a
decision to realign a parity, to alter significantly a target rate or
range or to borrow massively to assist in defending an exchange rate
undergoing heavy market pressure to devalue. Such decisions involve
major aspects of national economic and even political policy and are
usually taken by the national political authority, albeit with tech-
nical advice from the national monetary authorities.
Despite these general limitations central banks do exert substan-
tial influence on exchange rates by a variety of measures and tech-
niques which vary somewhat in different national settings. In the
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next section we provide a survey of the kinds of measures central
banks have been known to employ to influence exchange rates. This
overview is general rather than country-specific.
2 . Measures to Influence Exchange Rates
Central banks have an impressive array of measures by which to
influence exchange rates. Direct intervention in the foreign exchange
market by the purchase or sale of foreign exchange against the domes-
tic currency is the most immediate and flexible of these measures. It
may be regarded as the measure of first resort having a prompt effect
and thus being especially useful for fine tuning the central bank's
influence on the exchange rate. Such direct intervention may be
sterilized or non-sterilized. Intervention is considered to be steri-
lized when it is accomplished in a way that leaves the domestic and
foreign countries' monetary bases unchanged while changing the rela-
tive supplies available to the private sector of securities denomi-
nated in domestic and foreign currencies. Non-sterilized direct
intervention changes the monetary liabilities of one or both of the
domestic and foreign central banks (i.e., the domestic and/or foreign
monetary base). The recent cooperative set of theoretical and empiri-
cal studies carried out by central banks and finance ministries of
seven countries together with staff members of the European Economic
Communities and the Bank for International Settlements concludes that
non-sterilized intervention has more powerful effects on exchange
3
rates than does sterilized intervention. In this paper our empirical
work concerns direct intervention in the form of purchase or sale of
foreign exchange by the central bank. Data available to us do not
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permit us to distinguish empirically between sterilized and non-
sterilized intervention.
A second set of measures available to central banks at their own
discretion is the array of domestic instruments of monetary policy
including the central bank lending rate, its control over minimum
reserve requirements for bank deposits, open market operations in
securities or repurchase agreements, credit ceilings on commercial
banks and other measures to influence domestic money supply growth and
interest rates. The particular kit bag of such instruments varies
from country to country. The effect of changes in these instruments
on exchange rates operates in part through their ability to alter
money supply and interest rates by changing market conditions, partly
through their somewhat slower effect on aggregate demand and on the
current account balance via changes in relative prices over time, and
partly through expectations about future price levels, interest rates
and exchange rates as these may alter current potential or actual
capital flows. Sterilized intervention usually, although not always,
involves the use of some instruments from this set to offset or
neutralize the change in monetary base caused by purchase or sale of
foreign exchange during direct intervention.
Tax and fiscal policies, although outside the purview of the
central bank, are further examples of domestic policy measures that
may exert an influence on exchange rates. Examples are the influence
of the current and anticipated U.S. federal government budget deficit
on current and expected interest rates and exchange rates, the U.S.
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Interest Equalization Tax on interest receipts from loans to non-
residents in the 1960s, the repeal in 1984 of the U.S. withholding tax
on interest and dividends earned by non-residents, and negative
interest rates on non-resident bank deposits imposed in Switzerland to
deter unwanted capital inflows on certain past occasions.
A third set of measures to influence exchange rates may be broadly
characterized as forms of exchange control on capital movements.
These arrangements tend to be country-specific. Some, at least, may
be fully at the discretion of the central bank authorities while
others may require participation of finance ministries or other organs
of national government in their application. Control of the net
foreign position of commercial banks as practiced in Italy and France
is one such measure. Also, in cooperation with government authorities
central banks of France, Italy and the United Kingdom have on occasion
induced or directed local governments, public corporations and other
quasi-public institutions to borrow abroad thus increasing capital
inflows in foreign exchange. At times German authorities have imposed
special reserve requirements on bank deposits of non-residents and
have made certain interest-bearing marketable securities ineligible
for purchase by non-residents to reduce speculative capital inflows
that were putting upward pressure on the DM. On occasion Italian
authorities have required Italian firms to make non-interest-bearing
deposits at the central bank in advance of foreign payments. This
measure reduces leads in current account payments and also reduces the
domestic monetary base; both effects provide support to the foreign
exchange value of the lira.
The use of domestic policy instruments and of varieties of
exchange controls on capital movements occurs in varying combinations
and timing with direct intervention in the form of purchase and sale
of foreign exchange. A full discussion and empirical examination of
central bank, exchange rate policy should integrate this panoply of
measures both theoretically and empirically. The direction of effect
on exchange rates for each of these instruments taken singly is
theoretically clear but analysis of policy choices governing the com-
binations and timing of their use in concert is an extremely complex
task which exceeds both our ambition and ability. Not least of the
problems is our inability to quantify satisfactorily the influence of
some of these measures. Domestic and international political con-
siderations also may exert an influence on the strategy packages
adopted. Accordingly, we pursue the more modest goal of attempting to
explain and interpret central bank direct intervention in foreign
exchange markets. We omit entirely from our discussion such matters
as exchange controls on current account transactions, resort to dual
or multiple exchange rate systems and systems of explicit crawling
pegs as topics outside the scope of our present inquiry.
3. The Role of Intervention as a Central Bank Policy Instrument: A
General Perspective
In this section we set forth a general view of the role of central
bank intervention in the foreign exchange market as a basis for a for-
mal regression model to be estimated later in this paper. By "inter-
vention," to repeat, we mean the active purchase or sale of foreign
exchange against the domestic currency in the foreign exchange market.
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We lack the detailed and privileged information to distinguish empiri-
cally between non-sterilized and sterilized intervention and thus will
4
not be concerned to evaluate empirically their relative effectiveness.
We have referred earlier to a variety of "other measures" used by
central banks to influence exchange rates including their control over
the standard instruments of monetary policy and various types of ex-
change controls or measures to influence capital flows. In addition,
we are aware of the existence of types of off-market exchange transac-
tions, so-called "customer transactions," that may occur between a
central bank and its own government or agencies of a foreign govern-
ment and may be regarded as sterilized intervention for the effect
they have on an exchange rate. For example, interest earnings in
foreign exchange on foreign securities held by a central bank, if
retained in foreign exchange by investment in securities denominated
in the same foreign currency and purchased in the securities market,
will change the relative supplies of domestic and foreign securities
available to the private sector. Under portfolio theory and assuming
the domestic and foreign securities to be regarded by private investors
as not perfect substitutes this action will have interest rate and
exchange rate effects equivalent to sterilized intervention. Lack of
information prevents us from dealing explicitly with such interven-
tion.
An examination of the motives for active intervention will help us
to formulate a central bank's policy reaction function to be estimated
empirically. Central banks intervene to achieve an exchange rate dif-
ferent from that which market forces would produce in the absence of
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intervent ton. One obvious motive for intervention is to fulfill an
international commitment to maintain a fixed or relatively fixed
exchange rate. An example is the obligation to observe the commitment
under the EMS to preserve the parity grid. Until the parity implied by
the ECU central rate is altered by negotiation, intervention to pre-
serve the parity grid is obligatory and automatic:
...[E]ach participating central bank has published
buying and selling rates for each other participating
currency. During normal business hours the willing-
ness of the central bank, to deal at these rates will
ensure that market rates do not go beyond the limits,
for no commercial bank is going to deal at a rate
outside the limits with another bank when it could
obtain a better rate from the central bank. The cen-
tral bank has only to respond to requests to deal
initiated by the commercial banks; it need take no
initiative itself.
...When parity grid limit rates are activated, there
is no question as to which partner currency will be
used for intervention: that is decided by the com-
mercial banks on the basis of which market cross-
rates have reached their limits."
The limit implied by the divergence indicator in the EMS leaves more
discretion to the central bank and national government as to mode of
response when the limit to divergence is approached. Corrective
action may involve "other measures" such as domestic monetary policy
as well as intervention, but some amount of intervention is likely.
In less structured circumstances more discretionary motives may
guide intervention. One is to smooth and steady the market so the
market does not generate self-fulfilling short run speculative
variability. There is little doubt that intervention for this purpose
does occur. A related motive is to resist exchange rate movements
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that are expected by the central bank to be transitory and self-
reversing. The assumption is that private speculators will not do the
job for lack of adequate information or resources and that short run
exchange rate variability due to shocks or temporary circumstances
such as political disturbances or seasonal factors can have unde-
sirable consequences for firms involved in international trade. The
rationale for such intervention is stronger the longer the expected
duration of the temporary disturbance, since the adjustments imposed
on the real sector's resource allocation increase with the persistence
of the disturbance.
Another motive for central bank intervention is to hold an
exchange rate steady while gaining time for more fundamental, slower-
acting measures to be adopted and have their effect. The strongest
theoretical case for such intervention occurs when the central bank
and government are preparing new measures such as monetary policy or
fiscal policy to influence economic fundamentals with implications for
the exchange rate but have not yet announced these measures publicly,
possibly because their details have not yet been fully agreed upon.
It is a characteristic of intervention undertaken for the motives
described above that it seeks to resist the movement of the exchange
rate in the direction determined by market forces. This implies that
intervention measured by an increase or decrease in central bank
foreign exchange reserves should be inversely related to observed
appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate unless such inter-
vention is perfectly gauged to keep the exchange rate from moving at
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all. In that unlikely event no association between intervention and
exchange rate movement would be observed.
Other motives for exchange market intervention have been stated by
central banks or suggested by students of central bank behavior.
Central bankers sometimes speak of intervening to purchase foreign
exchange so as to rebuild foreign exchange reserves following a heavy
drain on their holdings during a period of sustained downward pressure
on the exchange value of the domestic currency or to reduce foreign
exchange holdings to more normal levels following a speculative
inflow. These occasions usually are associated with events preceding
and following a formal change in official parity as in an EMS realign-
ment or a change in an unstated target zone for the exchange rate
which the central bank has been defending. Intervention may sometimes
occur with the primary purpose of adjusting the domestic monetary base
or money supply as a substitute for the use of domestic instruments of
monetary policy. This is unsterilized intervention undertaken pri-
marily to influence domestic monetary conditions with effects on the
exchange rate ignored or secondary. As an alternative to central bank
operations in a domestic securities market this use of intervention is
unlikely for countries with well-developed domestic securities markets
and established central bank techniques for operating in these markets.
Thus, intervention for this purpose is unlikely in the four countries
under study. Nevertheless, should it occur, such intervention should
have the appearance of resisting the market movement of the exchange
rate.
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Yet another purpose for central bank direct intervention in the
foreign exchange market is to achieve a defined target rate. Such a
target rate may represent the central bank's view of an equilibrium
exchange rate consistent with fundamental economic forces as yet imper-
fectly reflected in the actual market rate or may represent a change
in policy. The concept of an equilibrium exchange rate evoked here is
that of modern asset theory with rational expectations. The interven-
tion may signal the authorities' intention to do what is necessary,
including altering basic monetary policy, to achieve market acceptance
of the target rate. If the market regards the signal as credible and
thus alters its expectations appropriately, intervention on a rela-
tively modest scale may bring the market to accept the target rate as
its equilibrium exchange rate. By contrast a central bank may some-
times intervene in an effort to establish or sustain a market rate
which is overvalued or undervalued relative to the market's view of
its equilibrium rate. For example the authorities may seek an under-
valued exchange rate for the purpose of protecting export and import-
competing industries from foreign competition, stimulating aggregate
demand for domestic output and contributing to a surplus or reduced
deficit in the balance of payments. Or they make seek an overvalued
exchange rate so as to cheapen imports and thus exert a downward or
restraining pressure on domestic price inflation. Under modern condi-
tions of high capital mobility (absent capital controls) even very
large scale intervention is unlikely to succeed for very long in main-
taining an overvalued or undervalued exchange rate. The trading flows
unleashed in the exchange market in response to asset stock disequilibria
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sensed by private sector portfolio managers can become too massive to
be resisted by central bank intervention when intervention policy
lacks credible support from monetary and fiscal policy, productivity
trends and other basic economic forces.
Attempts to create or maintain an overvalued or undervalued exchange
rate will appear as intervention to resist the market movement of the
exchange rate as the market seeks to establish an equilibrium rate
consistent with its expectations about economic fundamentals. However,
both practices violate rules of good behavior stipulated by the IMF
and EMS. They also are unlikely to succeed in the absence of stringent
and effective capital controls. Thus, intervention to resist the
market movement of the exchange rate normally should not represent a
persistent effort to preserve a disequilibrium rate.
Thus far this discussion of central bank purposes that guide
intervention suggests that the prevailing observable pattern charac-
terizing intervention should be one of resisting the direction of
movement of the market exchange rate. "Leaning against the wind" will
be characteristic of intervention undertaken to fulfill international
commitments to fixed exchange rates, to smooth and steady the market,
to resist exchange rate movements expected by the authorities to be
transitory and self-reversing, to gain time for other measures to
become effective, and to support an overvalued or undervalued exchange
rate. We contend, however, that the pattern of "leaning against the
wind" is primarily a short-run pattern most likely to be observed in
studies based on daily, weekly or even monthly data. As the period of
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observation lengthens the influence on the exchange rate of more per-
sistent and systematic economic forces becomes more evident relative
to that of short-run random and transitory influences. So far as
official intervention supports a target exchange rate consistent with
a market rate whose trend is unidirectional based on expectations
about economic fundamentals, the observed pattern of intervention may
be one of "leaning with the wind." This is the pattern we find in our
regression estimates based on quarterly data. We comment further on
this issue in section 6 in presenting our regression results.
We conclude this discussion of the .role of intervention as a
central bank policy instrument by quoting a statement of the Deutsche
Bundesbank which expresses both the aims and the limitations of offi-
cial intervention in exchange markets:
In its intervention policy the Bundesbank's guiding
principle is that interventions should be made only
for the purpose of maintaining "orderly market con-
ditions," and that fundamental trends in the market
should not (and cannot) be counteracted. However,
interventions have not only served to maintain
orderly market conditions and avoid hectic exchange
rate fluctuations from day to day, rather, the
attempt has been made to moderate excessive fluctua-
tions in the Deutsche Mark rate vis-a-vis the U.S.
dollar over extended periods of time. This has
been done not least also in the interest, and with
the full consent of the other members of the
Q
European currency bloc.
4. A General Model for Intervention Behavior
In this discussion we have set forth motives for central bank
intervention and concluded that in most cases intervention will be
undertaken to resist rather than to reinforce the market movement of
the exchange rate. However, intervention should not resist and may
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even reinforce a change in market rate judged to be consistent with a
change in economic fundamentals. We have also noted that intervention
is either obligatory or part of a broader discretionary response when
intervention points defined under rules of the EMS are reached or
approached. These considerations suggest that a general model for
intervention by central banks whose countries participate in the EMS
should include as explanatory variables the percentage rate of change
in the observed market exchange rate and appropriately designed indi-
cators of limits defined under EMS rules for the parity grid and the
divergence indicator. Thus,
(1) V = a Q + a 1 DERt + a^EMSBij. + a 3 ECU t
is an initial version of an intervention model, where
V = a measure of exchange market intervention
DER = percentage change in the exchange rate = Log [ER( t)/ER( t-1)
]
and ER = domestic per foreign currency
EMSBi = EMS bilateral parity grid indicator
ECU = EMS divergence indicator
Theories of exchange rate determination contained in the litera-
ture are a source for other variables that might enter a general model
for intervention behavior. There is a rich and expanding literature
in this area. For convenience we refer to the particular model for-
mulated by Peter Hooper and John Morton "Fluctuations in the Dollar:
9
A Model of Nominal and Real Exchange Rate Determination. This
model, building on work of Rudiger Dornbusch and Jeffrey Frankel,
expresses the current nominal spot exchange rate as a function of the
expected change in the long run equilibrium exchange rate (decomposed
-17-
into long run equilibrium price levels and real terms of trade com-
ponents) and terms deriving from the uncovered interest parity con-
dition including expected long run equilibrium rates of inflation and
domestic and foreign interest rates for the relevant period over which
a change in the spot rate is considered. One version of this model
expressed in logarithmic form is as follows:
(2) e = "p~ - "p~* + q - |f<r-7) " (r*-7*)]
where e = In of the spot exchange rate (domestic/foreign)
p = In of the long run equilibrium price level
q = In of the real exchange rate (= e - p + p*)
= a speed of adjustment parameter
r = interest rate (3-month rate at quarterly rate)
tt = inflation rate (at quarterly rate)
* = denotes foreign variable
- = denotes long run equilibrium rate
We note that Hooper and Morton expand this model into its more
detailed elements including monetarist versions of determinants of
equilibrium prices and the influence of current account trends on the
anticipated equilibrium real exchange rate as well as incorporating a
measure of risk premium before subjecting the model to econometric
tests. Our intentions are less ambitious.
We seek guidance from theory as to some manageable variables that
may be added to our model of intervention behavior. We have noted
various motives for active intervention to resist an exchange rate
change in the direction market forces are moving it. However, such
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resistance need not occur when the market movement is consistent with
a recent change in underlying economic forces such as monetary con-
ditions reflected in interest rates and inflation rates.
Our procedure is to difference (2) to obtain:
(3) de = dp" - d"p~* + dq - |d[(r-7)-(r*-7*)].
From (3) we discard dp, dp* and dq for our purposes offering two
reasons. First, we doubt the feasibility of calculating anticipated
changes in long run equilibrium prices and in real terms of trade.
Second, we are primarily interested in factors that dominate quarterly
changes in the exchange rate; we think changes in anticipated short
run real interest rates expressed in d[(r—it) - (r*—rr*)] have a stronger
claim to this role than do the discarded variables.
With this addition our model becomes:
(A) V = an + a.DER + a„ RelDifRealR + a„ECU + a. EMSBi ,t 1 t 2 3 4 t
where the terra including a 9 represents the last term of equation
(3).
We note that de = DER so that this percentage rate of change in the
exchange rate is a function of the change in the real interest rate
differential also included on the right hand side of (4). This
suggests some redundancy in the two variables which may pose some
problem in interpretation of the econometric estimates. Nevertheless,
there are some reasons for testing the model containing both
variables. First, we expect intervention to react to market changes
in the exchange rate and we believe there are forces influencing
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market behavior, other than changes in the real interest rate differen-
tial, that are reflected in DER. The relatively poor forecasting
record of models designed to explain the market exchange rate lends
credence to the view that the market rate contains information not
included in the explanatory variables of the models. Thus DER may
reflect influences otherwise missing from our model of intervention
behavior such as political events and other forms of "news" or,
perhaps, a change in expectations about the equilibrium real exchange
rate. Second, the observed value of DER is influenced by the inter-
vention which takes place during the time interval of observation.
Thus, there is a problem of multiple causation between intervention
and the percentage rate of change in the exchange rate used as an
explanatory variable for intervention. However, suppose in a par-
ticular calendar quarter intervention exactly offsets the market impe-
tus to change the exchange rate arising from a change in the real
interest rate differential and that the changing differential is the
sole influence acting to change the exchange rate. Then DER = and
if we omit the change in the real interest rate differential from the
model, we have no explanation for observed intervention behavior. With
the inclusion of the change in the real interest rate differential we
continue to explain intervention behavior under these circumstances.
Thus, the two explanatory variables supplement each other in the
regression model. In presenting our empirical results below we
discuss further the issue of inverse or joint causation and present
the results of statistical tests which support the causal direction
expressed in our regression model.
-20-
We have mentioned in our foregoing discussion various "other
measures" used by central banks to influence exchange rates.
Principal among these are changes in basic monetary policy and various
non-market measures to control capital flows. We make no attempt to
deal specifically with such measures in this paper. However, they
should be reflected at least partially in the observed percentage
change in the exchange rate and in changes in interest rate and infla-
tion rate differentials.
Decisions to agree to a negotiated realignment of exchange rates
within the EMS or to alter a target rate under a managed exchange rate
regime involve broader economic and political issues and processes
than lie within the discretion of central banks or are encompassed by
our model of intervention as developed thus far. Yet anticipated and
realized changes in such policy-chosen parities have consequences for
intervention behavior that should be reflected in an intervention
model even though the choices are not explained by the model. A
change in official parity or central rate within the EMS typically is
anticipated by the market from an appraisal of economic fundamentals.
Such market anticipation may cause speculative capital flows prior to
the change in central rate and reverse flows after the change. In
resisting the pressure of these speculative flows on the exchange rate
a central bank will intervene in the market. This aspect of interven-
tion is allowed for in this model by carefully considering the timing
of changes and the definition of variables for those changes. In par-
ticular we include three different variables to represent EMSBi, the
bilateral parity grid indicator. EMSBiO relates the current market
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exchange rate and the central bilateral rate defined as of the last
day of the quarter. This variable should influence intervention beha-
vior in line with the general theory outlined above. Second, we
include EMSBil where the central bilateral rate is that in effect one
month before the end of the quarter. This variable is intended to
detect the reverse flows of speculation, and therefore also observed
intervention, when there has been a change in the central bilateral
rate during the last month of the quarter. Last, we include EMSBilCube
which identifies nonlinearities in the reaction due to large changes
in the central bilateral rate.
There were also econometric problems, explained in section 5
below, for the first quarter of 1979. Hence we include a dummy
variable, IQ79 for this quarter.
The resulting final form for our general model for intervention
is as follows:
(5) V = a + a DER
t
+ a RelDifRealR + a_ ECU + a EMSBiO
+ a c EMSBil + a, EMSBilCube + a, IQ79 + u5 t 6 t 7 t
where u is a random error term.
Expected signs of the coefficients are uncertain for aA , a., a,,
u 1 o
and a7 ; minus for a„, a_, a ; ; and plus for a c .
5 . Measurement of Direct Intervention
To accomplish a quantitative study of central bank intervention
policy it is necessary to have a statistical time series for central
bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. Data on central
bank direct or active intervention in the foreign exchange market are
not made public by central banks. An alternative is to infer the
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amount of a central bank's nee intervention by using changes in the
value in dollars of its foreign exchange reserves from one observation
date to the next. The IMF's publication, International Financial
Statistics is a standard source for the dollar value of national
foreign exchange reserves on a quarter-year basis.
Unfortunately for the purpose at hand simple differences between
quarterly levels of the dollar value of national foreign exchange
reserves do not provide a reliable measure of central bank net inter-
vention in foreign exchange markets. This is because changes may
occur in the dollar value of a nation's foreign exchange reserves for
reasons other than the purchase or sale of foreign exchange by the
nation's central bank or other institution charged with responsibility
for foreign exchange dealing. Among the principal sources of such
changes other than intervention are interest receipts on official
foreign exchange assets, borrowing of foreign currencies by central
banks and governments to fortify exchange reserves during periods of
pressure on the exchange rate and repayments during periods of ease,
and changes in the dollar value of gold and of exchange reserves held
in non-dollar currencies. We adjust the IFS series for foreign
exchange for each of these undesired influences so far as published
data permit to obtain our measure of net purchase or sale of foreign
exchange.
Our first adjustment is to remove from the IFS series on foreign
exchange the dollar value of certain gold holdings that EMS member
nations have pledged to the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF)
as a condition of membership in the European Monetary System (EMS).
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This adjustment involves both a quantity and a price adjustment. The
gold inclusion and valuation problems date from March 1979 when the
EMS began its operation. Since that date (with a minor timing excep-
tion for the United Kingdom) central banks of EMS member states have
been required to deposit (actually to earmark while retaining physical
possession) 20 percent of their individual gold and dollar foreign
exchange reserves with the EMCF in exchange for European Currency
Units (ECUs). These dollars and the dollar value of gold so deposited
as ECU counterparts are included in the IMF's measure of the dollar
value of foreign exchange (otherwise excluding gold) for EMS member
countries. Thus, this special treatment of gold involved in the EMS
introduces a jump in the IMF's dollar valued exchange reserves series
for EMS members beginning in 1979.1. Moreover, arrangements between
the EMCF and central banks of member states are such that the gold
temporarily transferred to the EMCF is revalued at a market related
10
dollar price at the beginning of each calendar quarter. The dollar
value of pledged gold should be removed from the foreign exchange
series for two reasons. First, valuation changes in pledged gold do
not represent purchase and sale of foreign exchange during interven-
tion and should be excluded. Second, we wish to make a separate
adjustment for interest receipts on foreign exchange assets and gold
should not be viewed as foreign exchange for this purpose.
Precise information on the magnitude of changes in pledged gold
and its valuation is available only at the EEC and is not made public.
Accordingly, we make an adjustment for this effect for each quarter
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beginning in 1979.1 by deducting the current dollar value of 20 per-
cent of each nation's gold stock in troy ounces as of 1978.4 valued
each subsequent quarter at the London gold price in dollars per ounce
[series c for the United Kingdom in the IFS] . This adjustment removes
gold and changes in its valuation from the IFS series for foreign
exchange.
A rough adjustment for interest receipts on foreign exchange
assets can be made by applying the U.S. Treasury bill average rate for
the calendar quarter in question to the level of foreign exchange
assets. We are unable to estimate separately interest receipts on
assets denominated in non-dollar currencies so we ignore the distinction
and treat all foreign exchange assets as earning the same interest
rate as do dollar denominated assets. These estimated earnings in
dollars are then subtracted from the next quarter's dollar value of
foreign exchange holdings to net out interest receipts.
Part of the foreign exchange reserves of countries in our study is
held in non-dollar denominated assets. The dollar value of such
reserves changes when the exchange rate between the relevant non-
dollar currency and the dollar changes. Such changes do not represent
purchase or sale of foreign exchange and should be excluded from the
foreign exchange series for our purpose. We accomplish this correc-
tion by deducting from our foreign exchange series the IFS series
entitled "Counterpart to Valuation Change" [78d.d] which has been pre-
pared by the IMF to reflect such changes.
A further adjustment is desirable to remove from the foreign
exchange series official borrowings and repayments of foreign exchange
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which do not pass through the foreign exchange market and thus do not
represent direct intervention in that market. The more sizeable
official borrowings (and repayments) take the form of inter-central
bank swaps and claims arising from foreign central bank intervention to
support the domestic country's exchange rate. We measure active,
direct intervention in the foreign exchange market by first differences
in the adjusted series for the level of foreign exchange reserves. Any
net borrowing of foreign exchange during a quarter will overstate
intervention in the form of a purchase of foreign exchange while any
net repayment will overstate the sale of foreign exchange. Thus we
wish to subtract official borrowing and add official repayment.
To adjust our first difference on foreign exchange for official
borrowing and repayment we use three series provided in the IFS. The
first is entitled "Reserve Position in the Fund" [led.]. We add the
quarterly first difference in this series to our basic series for
intervention. If the first difference in "Reserve Position in the
Fund" has a negative sign this signifies borrowing and vice versa.
Thus addition of the first difference keeping the appropriate sign
corrects for official borrowing or repayment involving a country's
reserve position in the Fund. A similar adjustment is needed for
first differences in the series entitled "Use of Fund Credit" [2e.s]
but with sign reversal since an increase in level and thus a positive
first difference signifies borrowing.
A final adjustment for official borrowing is made by subtracting
from our series representing intervention the IFS series entitled
"Liabilities Constituting Foreign Authorities Reserves" [79x.d]. No
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first difference is needed for this series which is a flow series
taken from balance of payments statistics. This item represents
changes in claims of foreign banks on the domestic central bank. It
includes normal operating balances of foreign central banks at the
domestic central bank. This may be important for "reserve center"
banks such as the Bank of England and the Deutsche Bundesbank. These
normal operating balances should be omitted from our adjustment but
our data do not permit this. More importantly for our purpose this
item includes "swap" borrowings by the domestic central bank and
foreign central bank claims arising from foreign central bank inter-
vention to support the domestic central bank's exchange rate. Both
are forms of borrowing (or repayment) of foreign exchange reserves
which must be netted out of our series for changes in foreign exchange
in order for the latter to represent more accurately intervention in
the form of active purchase and sale of foreign exchange in the
market.
Our measure of active direct intervention in the foreign exchange
market is first differences in the IFS series entitled "foreign
exchange" [ld.d] modified by the adjustments just discussed. We are
aware of other forms of official borrowing and repayment that may
distort our desired measure of intervention but for which we lack
published data to make desirable adjustments. We discuss three such
cases for the information of the reader. First, borrowing by central
banks and governments in the eurodollar market may add to official
foreign exchange reserves in dollars without passing through the
foreign exchange market if the authorities retain loan proceeds in
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dollar denominated assets. In principle differences in foreign
exchange reserves on successive dates should be adjusted to exclude
such borrowings and repayments before changes in foreign exchange
reserves can be taken to represent net intervention in the foreign
exchange market. We are not able to make this adjustment.
Another important category of borrowing to increase national
foreign exchange reserves has been referred to as "induced or directed
borrowing" undertaken at the direction of government or national mone-
tary authorities by local governments, public utilities and other
public or quasi-public firms and institutions. When proceeds from
such borrowing are converted into domestic currency by the borrower,
the conversion occurs via the foreign exchange market and thus
increases official exchange reserves only if the central bank inter-
venes. Thus, in this circumstance, there is no need to net out such
borrowing from changes in foreign exchange reserves in calculating the
amount of central bank intervention. However, if the foreign exchange
proceeds of such borrowing are retained in foreign currency denomi-
nated assets and placed on deposit with the central bank without con-
version to domestic currency, they will increase official foreign
exchange reserves without the occurrence of direct intervention by the
central bank. In such cases these loans and repayments should be
netted out from changes in official foreign exchange reserves when
such changes are used to estimate net intervention by the central
bank. One identifiable instance of this kind is the use of "compen-
satory loans" by the Italian monetary authorities. Other instances of
this practice may occur in other countries without being identified in
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published statistics. In principle directed borrowing of this second
kind should be netted out from the statistics on official foreign
exchange reserves in estimating central bank intervention in the
foreign exchange market. In this paper we have not attempted such an
adjustment
.
Central banks sometimes borrow foreign exchange from domestic
commercial banks by means of "swaps" in which the commercial banks
transfer foreign exchange assets to the central bank in return for a
deposit claim on the liability side of the central bank's balance
sheet. Once again, such transactions should be netted out from the
foreign exchange series for the purpose of estimating direct interven-
tion by the central bank. Since such swaps are undertaken to "window
dress" the central bank's balance sheet, their accounting entry both
in the central bank's balance sheet and that of commercial banks
usually is buried in some undecipherable category. Moreover, dates of
published balance sheets of the central bank and commercial banks may
be deliberately chosen not to coincide so as to prevent direct com-
parisons of counterpart entries. For these reasons it is not possible
to adjust published foreign exchange series to net out the effect of
such swaps with commercial banks.
Quarterly first differences in the IFS statistical series entitled
"Foreign Exchange" [ld.d] adjusted as has been described serve as our
measure of net direct active intervention in the foreign exchange
market by the central banks included in this study. In the statisti-
cal appendix we present a precise symbolic definition of the interven-
tion measure together with general descriptions and sources for all
data used in this study.
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6. Central Bank Exchange Market Intervention Behavior: Econometric
Results for Germany and France
Table I presents our estimated intervention equation for the
Deutsche Bundesbank. The table contains variable names and defini-
tions, coefficients and their t-ratios, the value of R square, the
Durbin-Watson statistic and a test statistic to be discussed below.
Data are quarterly observations for the period 1975-1 to 1983-3.
Estimation is by ordinary least squares.
DER is the percentage rate of change in the DM/$ exchange rate
over a calendar quarter. By itself, it expresses the influence of all
forces that cause an exchange rate to change measured over this period.
It does not express shorter-run variability within a quarter.
The information conveyed by DER is altered, however, when changes
in the nominal interest rate and inflation rate differentials (as in
RelDifRealR) are included in our regression equation, since their
influence on intervention may act both directly as they condition
central bank views of an equilibrium exchange rate and indirectly via
the market exchange rate itself. To investigate these separate
effects we first regressed DER on RelDifR and RelDiflnf . Then the
residual of this regression was used in our intervention equation in
place of DER. Since this revised equation also includes changes in
the interest rate and inflation rate differentials, the coefficients
of RelDifR and RelDiflnf correctly show both the direct and indirect
effects of these variables, while DER expresses the effect on inter-
vention of all other forces acting through the exchange rate. Very
little of the variation in DER was explained by changes in the




























Time is measured in quarters.
Data Set 1975-1 to 1983-3.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Intervention (Millions of US Dollars)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
In the following descriptions, f(x) means log first difference, i.e.,
f(x) = 100 * log[x(t)/x(t-l)j
.
For these variables, coefficients are all measured as millions of
dollars per one percent change in the underlying independent
variable.
DER = f(ER)
ER = DM per $ (end of period)
RelDifRealR = f(rGer/rUS * Gerinf1/USinf 1
)
rGER is one plus the German day-to-day money rate, period average
rUS is one plus the US treasury bill rate, period average.
Gerinfl = GerCPK t )/GerCPI( t-1)
USinfl = USCPI9t)/USCPI(t-l)
EMSBiO = 100*[log Ger/Fr ER - log EMS Central Rate]
or before the Central Rate was established.
Both rates are those in effect the last day of the quarter.
EMSBil = EMSBiO except the Central Rate is dated one month before the
end of the quarter.
EMSBilCube = cube of EMSBil.
ECU = 100* [log DM/ECU ER - log DM/ECU Central Rate] (end of quarter)
or before the Central Rate was established.
IQ79 = 1 for first quarter of 1979 and elsewhere.
Coefficient is millions of dollars in the period.
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to the general lack of success by. economists in their attempts to
explain exchange rate changes econome trically. As a result, the
equation employing the residual form of DER is almost the same as that
employing DER. Since these results do not differ greatly, we report
only the equation estimated with DER.
While the variable DER may include some of the effects just
discussed, its primary contribution is to reflect "news" as discussed
in section 4. By definition news is unexpected. Whether the authori-
ties choose to intervene to resist or support news-induced changes in
the market exchange rate may well depend on the nature of the news in
each instance. For this reason we have no prior view as to the sign
expected on DER and indeed a coefficient of zero would not be unreason-
able. This latter interpretation is confirmed by the lack of signifi-
cance for the coefficient on DER in our econometric results in Table I.
RelDifRealR measures the percentage rate of change in the real
interest rate differential between Germany and the United States. It
includes the effects of the nominal interest rate differential,
RelDifR, and the inflation differential, RelDiflnf. The significant
negative coefficient on RealDifRealR implies that the Bundesbank's
intervention policy supports an exchange rate change in response to a
change in economic forces as expressed in real interest rate differen-
tials. Thus, intervention policy supports a movement in the exchange
rate in the direction of equilibrium as analyzed in contemporary
theories of exchange rate determination. In other words, the authori-
ties "lean with the wind" over periods of a calendar quarter.
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LogicalLy such support can take the form of intervention to resist
a temporary movement of the spot rate away from the equilibrium direc-
tion indicated by the change in the real interest rate differential or
alternatively to accelerate the movement of the spot rate in the
direction of a changing equilibrium. Studies of intervention behavior
based on daily, weekly, or monthly data typically have found that
central banks intervene to resist the direction of movement of the
market exchange rate, that is, they "lean against the wind." Our
study, however, uses quarterly data for net cumulative intervention
and for changes in the real interest rate differential. The quarterly
time period opens the possibility that the prevailing movement in the
equilibrium exchange rate as assessed by the central bank is unidirec-
tional during the calendar quarter and that intervention occurs only
or predominantly to oppose short run market movements away from such
an equilibrium direction. The degree of uncertainty involved in
analyzing equilibrium exchange rate paths clearly admits of the possi-
bility that market sentiment may differ from central bank views in the
short run. Our regression results cannot distinguish between inter-
vention to resist market movement away from equilibrium and interven-
tion to accelerate market movement toward equilibrium. The former
interpretation is more consistent with central bankers' undertakings
under international agreements and their stated policy not to engage
in "aggressive" intervention behavior.
Another possible explanation for the significant negative coef-
ficient on RelDifRealR might appear to be that both the interest rate
and intervention are responding jointly to some other force acting on
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the exchange rate and not included in the regression equation or that
causation is reverse running from a change in the exchange rate to a
change in the interest rate differential. For example, non-sterilized
intervention to resist a depreciation of the domestic currency might
raise the domestic interest rate by reducing the money supply. Or,
the authorities might both intervene and raise the domestic interest
rate to resist depreciation. The theory underlying our intervention
equation implies that intervention responds to a change in the real
interest rate differential whereas the reverse or joint causation
hypotheses stress the link, between intervention and the nominal
interest rate. Therefore, a test of the competing hypotheses can be
made by estimating the model as we present it with the real interest
rate. Then the difference between the real and nominal interest rate
is added to the model as a separate variable. (In this case this dif-
ference variable is the percentage change in the difference in the
inflation rates in Germany and the United States.) If this latter
variable has a coefficient significantly different from zero, then the
reverse or joint causation hypothesis is supported. If the coefficient
is not significantly different from zero, then the direct theory that
we propose is supported. The results of this test are reported in the
last line of Table I (and later Table II for France) in the form of the
t-ratio for the estimated coefficient on RelDiflnf. The indicated non-
significance of the coefficient supports the real interest rate theory
underlying our equation.
The variable ECU represents the divergence of the DM/ECU market
rate from its central rate established by the EMS. When this
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divergence indicator approaches a specified limit the appropriate
national authority is expected to undertake corrective action which
may take the form of exchange market intervention or other measures
such as changes in domestic monetary or fiscal policy. Thus, inter-
vention is not mandatory in response to warnings from the divergence
indicator so it is possible that little effect will be observed.
Nevertheless, we have a significant negative coefficient.
The variable EMSBiO or "bilateral parity grid indicator" repre-
sents the Deutsche mark/French franc market exchange rate in relation
to its central rate under EMS rules. The design of the variable is
given in notes to the table. Both the market exchange rate and the
central rate are observed as of the last day of the quarter. EMS
rules establish a specific limit to movement of this variable. Inter-
vention is automatic when the limit to the bilateral parity is reached
and may be discretionary prior to that limit. An increase in the
DM/FF exchange rate moves the rate toward the limit and calls for
German or French intervention to prevent the limit from being surpassed,
Such intervention causes a decrease in the level of German foreign
exchange holdings as measured in this paper whether the actual inter-
vention is carried out by the Deutsche Bundesbank or the Banque de
France. As expected, the coefficient has a negative sign. It is
significant at the 6 percent one tail level.
The next variable is EMSBil. It represents the same bilateral
parity grid indicator as EMSBiO, but the central rate to which the
market rate is compared is that in effect one month before the end of
the quarter. When the central rate does not change in that month, the
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variable is identical to EMSBiO, but when it changes, the variable is
likely to be large, indicating the large change in the current rate
from the old central rate. Its coefficient will then represent the
speculative flows and related intervention behavior that are reversed
right after a change in the central rate. Its coefficient is expected
to be positive. This coefficient is very significant reflecting the
importance to intervention behavior of this unwinding of speculative
positions.
Next consider the variable EMSBilcube. It, allows large values of
EMSBil to have effects that are moderated or increased from those
indicated by a linear model. In this case the coefficient is negative
indicating a moderating influence on the positive coefficient of EMSBil.
This variable is particularly important for the devaluations that
France undertook in 1981 and early 1982. We interpret this result to
mean that the flow back into France of speculative funds that would
typically be expected following official validation of market expecta-
tions was reduced or did not occur at these times because the devalua-
tions were not sufficient to reassure speculators against the franc.
In the intervention regression for Germany we enter a dummy
variable for the first quarter of 1979, IQ79. This quarter poses spe-
cial analytical and measurement problems. The EMS began operation on
March 13, 1979, at which time EMS member nations agreed to deposit 20
percent of their existing gold and dollar reserves with the European
Monetary Cooperation Fund. As explained in section 5 this change
requires substantial adjustments in our measure of intervention in
-36-
this quarter. These adjustments eliminated a large unexplained resid-
ual for this quarter in earlier regressions estimated for France and
Italy performed on an unadjusted measure of intervention. Staff of
the IMF with whom we have had discussions believe that the unadjusted
IFS series for "foreign exchange" for Germany is conceptually com-
parable to those for France and Italy despite the fact that published
sources from the Deutsche Bundesbank show that the Bundesbank enters
an offsetting liability in its balance sheet for the dollar value of
12
gold transferred to the EMCF. When we accept the IMF interpretation
and make adjustments to the German foreign exchange series (used in
calculating our measure of intervention) comparable to adjustments
applied to the French and Italian series, we obtain a very large
unexplained residual in the German intervention regression for 1979.1.
For this reason we use a dummy variable for this quarter which is
significant. In the French regression a dummy variable for 1979.1 was
significant in our earlier regression with the unadjusted measure of
intervention but not for the adjusted measure—a directly contrary
result.
Finally, we call attention to the R square of .688 for our German
intervention equation which we regard as highly satisfactory as a
measure of explanatory power for a phenomenon as difficult to explain
as central bank intervention behavior.
Table II presents our estimated intervention equation for the
Banque de France. Again, data are quarterly. Intervention, measured
as before, is explained principally by changes in the real interest
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Time is measured in quarters.
Data Set 1975-1 to 1983-2.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Intervention (Millions of US Dollars)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
In the following descriptions, f(x) means log first difference, i.e.,
f(x) = 100 * log [x(t)/x(t-l].
For these variables, coefficients are all measured as millions of
dollars per one percent change in the underlying independent
variable.
DER = f(ER)
ER = ffr per $ (end of period)
RelDifReaIR = f(rEr/rUS * Frinf1/Usinf 1)
rFr is one plus the French call money rate, period average.
rUS is one plus the US treasury bill rate, period average.
Frinfl = FrCPI( t )/FrCPI( t-1)
USinfl = USCPI(t)/USCPI(t-l)
EMSBil = 100* [log FrGer ER - log EMS Central Rate]
or before the Central Rate was established.
The ER is dated the end of the quarter and the central rate is
dated one month before the end of quarter.
This variable is the log of the reciprocal of the similar variable
employed in the German regression.
EMSBilCube = cube of EMSBil.
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raeasures Che effect of "news" as expressed in the percentage change in
the FF/US exchange rate. The coefficient here is very small indeed
with a t-ratio of .09. As with Germany the variable RelDifRealR
explains a great deal and the test for joint or reverse causation has
the same non-significant result as for Germany.
The variable representing the bilateral parity constraint between
the French franc and the Deutsche mark (EMSBiO), and that representing
the divergence of the FF/ECU market rate from its central rate
established by the EMS, (ECU), were not significant with the correct
signs and have been dropped from this regression. This result
suggests that France did not respond to these limits systematically
throughout the period under study: 1975.1-1983.2. This conjecture is
strengthened by the fact that the franc was subject to a managed float
from June 1976 to November 1979 and was devalued three times in the
period October 1981 to March 1983.
EMSBil represents the unwinding of speculative positions following
a devaluation as does EMSBicube. Their coefficients are significant
and similar to those for Germany. The dummy variable for the first
quarter of 1979 was not significant indicating that the data transfor-
mations (discussed in Section 5) appear to do their job for France.
Again, as with Germany, we regard the R square of .475 as quite satis-
factory.
7 . Conclusions and Final Comments
Central bank exchange rate policy is a subject considerably
broader and more complex than central bank intervention policy. In
our quantitative empirical work we have concentrated on intervention
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policy because of its comparative feasibility. Even here there are
difficulties. We have defined intervention as the purchase and sale
of foreign exchange. Since central banks do not publish intervention
data we have sought to develop a proxy measure for intervention by
making a number of adjustments to the series on "foreign exchange"
published by the IMF in International Financial Statistics . We are
aware of further adjustments that should be made in principle but for
which we lack adequate data. Nevertheless, we believe our adjusted
measure of intervention is sufficiently like the true series to merit
the use to which we have put it. We would welcome access to a true
series to test this belief.
Our theoretical model for intervention behavior contains as explan-
atory variables the percentage change in a key exchange rate, changes
in real interest rate differentials between the relevant domestic and
foreign countries, and variables to represent bounds to parity zones
specified by rules of the EMS. Our econometric results imply inter-
vention to support changes in the equilibrium exchange rate as this is
influenced by changes in the real interest rate differential. As
expected, intervention also occurs to conform to EMS intervention
rules except when the underlying economic forces make EMS parity zones
untenable resulting in a realignment of central rates within the rela-
tively fixed-rate EMS system. Anticipated or realized parity changes
cause capital flows to which intervention reacts so that some
appropriate representation of parity changes in the intervention model
is highly desirable. The variables EMSBil and EMSBilCube represent
this effect in our present model. Our intervention model is incapable
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of explaining a decision to realign parities within the EMS or to
reset an implicit target exchange rate to be defended by intervention
policy. Such decisions are aspects of central bank or national ex-
change rate policy that require a much broader analytical framework
than that needed for intervention policy.
In Sections 1 and 2 we have characterized the scope and role of
central bank exchange rate policy within the framework of national
economic policy and have described measures other than direct, active
intervention available to various central banks to influence exchange
rates. Policy decisions regarding these matters involve relatively
complex economic and even political issues which are not readily
amenable to analysis by rigorous quantitative methods. They certainly
lie outside the scope of this paper. However, considerable insight
into both sets of issues may be achievable by detailed study of actual
historical episodes, particularly those when large changes in market





Data for EMS bilateral central rates and EMS ECU central rates are
from IMF Occasional Paper 19, The European Monetary System: The
Experience, 1979-82 , by Horst Ungerer, with Owen Evans and Peter
Nyberg (May 1983), Appendix I, Tables 2 and 4.
All other data are from the IMF tape for International Financial
Statistics updated where necessary using various issues of the IMF's
International Financial Statistics.
Intervention Definition
The measure of "intervention" used as the dependent variable in our
regression models for Germany and France has been discussed in Section





FE = Foreign Exchange (asset) $millions
RPF = Reserve Position in the Fund (asset) $millions
UFC = Use of Fund Credit (liability) SDR millions
SDR = SDR per domestic currency times domestic currency per $
= SDR per $
GQ = Gold Reserve in ounces
GP = London Gold Price ($ per ounce) from IMF UK series c
LCFAR = Liability Constituting Foreign Authorities Reserves (flow)
$millions
CVC = Counterpart to Valuation changes (flow) $million
R = US Treasury Ittll Rate ror 1 quarter investment.
= (1. + USTB) - 1.
Assets = [FE + RPF - UFC * SDR]
VA = Assets(t) - Assets(t-l) - LCFAR - CVC - R(t-l) * FE(t-l)
For the period before 1979-1 when EMS formed:
V = VA
In 1979-1, 20 percent of the gold reserve was moved to EMS reserves.
For this one quarter:
V = VA - GQ(78-4 * .2 * GP(t-l)
For the succeeding quarters we adjust for gold price changes and
interest earnings as appropriate.
For 79-2 and beyond:
V = VA + [R(t-l)*GQ(t-l) + GP(t-l) - GP(t)] * .2*GQ(78-4)
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NOTES
Report of the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention" by
the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention established at
the Versailles Summit of the Heads of State and Government, June
4, 5 and 6, 1982 (March 1983), 36 pp. rairaeo. In addition to the
summary report a number of supporting studies, though not all,
have been published as follows:
Bank of Canada, A Study of the Efficiency of Foreign Exchange
Markets
,
by David Longworth, Paul Boothe and Kevin Clinton,
October 1983, 92 pp. mimeo.
Bank of England, "Intervention, Stabilization and Profits,"
Quarterly Bulletin
,
Vol. 23, No. 3, Sept. 1983, pp. 384-391.
Banca d 1 Italia, "A Case Study of the Effectiveness of Foreign
Exchange Market Intervention: The Italian Lira (September
1975-March 1977), by Stefano Micossi and Salvatore Rebecchini,
Research Department, Discussion Papers on International
Economics and Finance , No. 4, December 1983, 44 pp.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Staff Studies
,
as follows:
126. Definition and Measurement of Exchange Market Intervention
,
by Donald B. Adams and Dale W. Henderson, August 1983, 5 pp.
130
.
Effects of Exchange Rate Variability on International
Trade and Other Economic Variables: A Review of the
Literature
,
by Victoria S. Farrell with Dean A. DeRosa and T.
Ashby McCowan, January 1984, 21 pp.
131. Calculations of Profitability for U.S. Dollar Deutsche
Mark Intervention
,
by Laurence R. Jacobson. October 1983, 8
pp.
132. Time Series Studies of the Relationship Between Exchange
Rates and Intervention: A Review of the Techniques and
Literature
,
by Kenneth Rogoff. October 1983, 15 pp.
133. Relationships Among Exchange Rates, Intervention and
Interest Rates: An Empirical Investigation
,
by Bonnie E.
Loopesko. November 1983, 20 pp.
134. Small Empirical Models of Exchange Market Intervention:
A Review of the Literature
,
by Ralph W. Tryon, October 1983,
14 pp.
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Several other studies in the Board of Governors' Series are
promised as "forthcoming." See Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin , January 1984, pp.
A73-A74.
2. International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund , Article I, Section (iii) and
Article VIII, Section 2(a).
3. "Report of the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention,"
pp. 17 and ff.
4. For such an evaluation see "Report of the Working Group on
Exchange Market Intervention," and related studies listed in
footnote 1.
5. For a rewarding discussion of types of central banks transactions
that may constitute "intervention" see especially Federal
Reserve Board of Governors, Staff Studies No. 126, "Definition
and Measurement of Exchange Market Intervention," by Donald B.
Adams and Dale W. Henderson.
6. Bank of England, "Intervention Arrangements in the European
Monetary System," in Quarterly Bulletin , Vol. 19, No. 2, June
1979, p. 194.
7. For a brief account of intervention by the Federal Reserve System
to steady the market prior to the announcement of a new support
package for the U.S. dollar in October 1979 see Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, Quarterly Review , Winter 1979-80, Vol. 4, No.
4, pp. 58-61.
8. Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank for the Year 1974
,
p. 60.
9. Hooper, Peter and John Morton, "Fluctuations in the Dollar: A
Model of Nominal and Real Exchange Rate Determination," Journal
of International Money and Finance (1982), 1, pp. 39-56.
10. "At the beginning of each quarter adjustments are made to the
revolving swaps between the central banks and the EMCF in order
to ensure that each central bank's contribution to the EMCF con-
tinues to represent at least 20 percent of its gold and dollar
reserves, valued in accordance with the ruling dollar rates or
the price of gold. As in the case of the initial contribution,
this value is based for gold on the average price, converted into
ECUs, of the last six months (but not more than the price on the
penultimate working day of the period), and for the dollar on the
market rate two working days before the value date." Deutsche
Bundesbank, "The European Monetary System: Structure and
Operation," in Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank
,
Vol.
31, No. 3, March 1979, p. 16.
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11. See Donald V. Coes, "Exchange Market Intervention in Four
European Countries," in Donald R. Hodgraan (editor), Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series No. 26, The Political
Economy of Monetary Policy: National and International Aspects
,
1984, pp. 206-22 and items cited in Coes' bibliography.
12. See Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank for the Year 1979
, pp.
57-58 where there appears this statement: "By valuing the gold
transferred to the EMCF (through swap agreements) at market-
oriented prices that are brought into line with the actual market
developments at quarterly intervals a "liquidity gain" results
which can easily lead to the financing potential of these
resources being overstated. (This gain is offset in the
Bundesbank's balance sheet by a contra-entry on the liabilities
side.)" An example of such a contra-entry in calculating the
monetary reserves entering the net external position of the
Bundesbank may be seen in Table IX. 6, "External Position of the
Deutsche' Bundesbank" in Monthly Report of the Deutsche
Bundesbank , Vol. 31, No. 5, May 1979, p. 74*.
13. For example, see Forrest Capie and Geoffrey Wood, "Devaluation in
Historical Perspective: The United Kingdom Case" in this volume.
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